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Abstract: 
Buying firms are increasingly confronted with compliance scandals in their upstream supply 
chain, for which they are held accountable by their stakeholders. Purely symbolic practices, 
typically referred to as greenwashing, as well as substantive practices, such as green supplier 
championing, are thus receiving widespread attention in business practices and academia alike. In 
this study, we reveal the impact of two opposing leadership dimensions following the concepts of 
ethical and transactional leadership as antecedents for green supplier championing and 
greenwashing. We particularly address whether these antecedents have a complementary or a 
counterproductive effect on green supplier championing and greenwashing. Furthermore, we 
investigate the complementary impact of incentives and the two leadership styles on achieving 
sustainability behavior. The resulting model is tested using a path analysis based on a data set of 
118 firms located in Germany. We find support for the positive impact of ethical leadership on 
green supplier championing but also a non-significant negative impact on greenwashing. 
Greenwashing is significantly impacted by leadership styles reflecting obedience to authority, 
and further moderated by ethical incentives. Interestingly, ethical incentives do not moderate the 
impact of ethical leadership on green supplier championing. Finally, we discuss implications for 
theory and business practice.  
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1. Introduction 
Non-compliance with ethical and sustainability standards is still a common problem in global 
supply chains, although it has the potential to damage the reputation of focal firms, which in turn 
can negatively affect the economic performance of these firms (Reuter et al., 2010). Poignant 
examples include the 2010 oil spill at BP’s “Deepwater Horizon” on the Gulf Coast. During that 
accident, 3 million barrels of oil spewed into the Gulf and caused massive destruction of plant 
and wildlife habitats and in turn negatively affected many people living in surrounding coastal 
areas (Borney, 2016). Overall, this ecological catastrophe incurred BP a charge of more than 60 
billion USD for restauration, penalties, and recovery of damages (Borney, 2016). Therefore, to 
counteract such potentially devastating occurrences, firms often develop and implement 
measures like codes of conduct and sustainability guidelines for own sourcing personnel as well 
as suppliers (Kaptein, 2004; Schleper and Busse, 2013).  
  Unfortunately, these initiatives have often been criticized as being ineffective and rather 
as being a form of window-dressing and greenwashing (Jiang, 2009a) that serves only as 
symbolic measure (McDonnell and King, 2013; Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012). Hitherto, 
greenwashing has mainly been defined as misleading consumers regarding the green (often in a 
broader sense sustainable) performance of a firm or the environmental (sustainable) benefits of a 
certain practice, product, or service (Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Laufer, 2003; Lyon and 
Montgomery, 2015; Parguel et al., 2011). According to the renowned advertising agency Ogilvy 
and Mather, greenwashing practices have significantly increased in the last decades and take on 
“epidemic proportions” nowadays (Hsu, 2011). Some scholars suppose the increased regulative 
and normative pressure for green accounting and transparency to be an important driver of these 
developments (Bromley and Powell, 2012). 
  Only recently, the world biggest car manufacturer Volkswagen serves as one of the most 
intrusive and telling examples of greenwashing (Preston, 2015). When Volkswagen was caught 
systematically cheating in emission tests in the US and Europe in 2015, the president of Clean 
Air Watch commented: “Volkswagen made a point in selling these cars that they’re clean. It’s 
too bad that their technology wasn’t as good as their ads” (Plungis, 2015). And at the same time 
Volkswagen claimed to work in an environmentally friendly fashion as illustrative statements in 
their 2014 sustainability report pretend (e.g., “We intend to put our creative powers to good use 
for the benefit of people and the environment” (Volkswagen, 2015, p. 14)).   
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To consequently prevent sustainability concerns in upstream supply chains, firms must 
implement convincing substantial measures that actually impact supplier conduct (Marquis et al., 
2016). Most buying firms strive to continuously improve the sustainability performance within 
their supply base through proactive supplier management (Blome et al., 2014; Paulraj et al., 
2014; Schoenherr et al., 2014). Consequently, many firms have begun to focus on sourcing from 
so called green or sustainable champions, which play a crucial role in disseminating 
sustainability practices in the upstream supply chain, as focal firms do not have direct access and 
control over the suppliers of their direct suppliers (Gallear et al., 2015; Wilhelm et al., 2016). 
Green supplier championing should thus be considered as a substantial means to proactively 
manage the upstream supply base and to disseminate green and responsible business practices 
further upstream in the supply chain (Roth et al., 2008). However, though we find evidence of 
environmental championing and best practices in the field of supplier management, there is still a 
lack of empirical literature assessing the actual antecedents and drivers of green supplier 
championing. 
Most importantly, green supplier championing and greenwashing might even co-exist and 
be triggered by the very same antecedents (e.g., incentives). For instance, besides its at that point 
latent cheating, Volkswagen was named best in class in 2015 by the prestigious Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indices (Hepler, 2015). Another prominent example is Walmart. On the one hand, 
Walmart claims to be a leader in sustainability practices (e.g., responsible sourcing practices, 
sourcing audits), and on the other hand, Walmart was awarded the “Greenwasher of the year 
2014” title by Green Life given its extensive carbon footprint of the sourcing and distribution 
network. Thus, we investigate the co-existence of substantive (i.e., supplier championing) and 
symbolic practices (i.e., greenwashing) simultaneously in this study.  
Scholarly knowledge about firm-level antecedents of these substantive and symbolic 
practices in sustainable supply chain management is still at an early stage, particularly when 
considering potential interaction of antecedents. As decisions on green supplier championing and 
greenwashing are ethical choices we turn our attention to antecedents that are most important to 
affecting ethical choices, the organizational culture (e.g., Huhtala et al., 2013; Treviño et al., 
1999). In situations in which employees face ethically dilemmas, particularly two dimensions of 
organizational culture have been shown to have the strongest effects on ethical decision making 
in organizations: the leadership style and the incentive schemes (e.g., Chen, 2010; Delmas and 
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Burbano, 2011; Ims et al., 2014; Kulshreshta, 2005; Treviño and Brown, 2004; Tullberg, 2009; 
Weaver et al., 1999a). In her numerous studies (e.g., Treviño et al., 1998; Treviño et al., 1999; 
Treviño et al., 2003) Treviño finds support for the proposition that “most people need to be led 
when it comes to ethics” (Treviño and Brown, 2004, p. 71). Ethical leadership is hence an 
important antecedent for ethical behavior in organizations (see Brown and Treviño, 2006 for an 
overview), although the effect of leadership styles on the implementation of CSR and 
sustainability in organizations calls for further research (Eisenbeiss, 2012; Waldmann and Siegel, 
2008). However, besides ethical leadership, formalized organizational contexts might play an 
important role in ethical decision making. As many individuals focus on extrinsic motivational 
factors in guiding their behavior, we assume incentives to be a moderator in our study. Treviño 
and Brown (2004, p. 79) even suggest that “the reward system may be the single most important 
way to deliver a message about what behaviors are expected”. This is in line with prior research 
that also found a positive relationship between falsely adjusted organizational incentive schemes 
and unethical behavior (e.g., Carson, 2003; Chen, 2010; Harris and Bromiley, 2007, Ims et al., 
2014). 
Also, from a practitioners’ perspective, leadership and incentives constitute factors which 
the top management of firms can influence, thus allowing firms to effectively alter their practices 
instantly. Hence, this focus might help managers to understand how to transcend a mere 
compliance focus within their sustainable supplier management practices towards more proactive 
measures. Although the case is not yet cleared up due to lacking informants and further 
information sources, many experts suppose Volkswagen’s corporate leadership and incentive 
schemes to be likely reasons for the scandal (Armour, 2016). So far, studies investigating 
leadership styles and incentives in the sustainable supply chain area are limited to notable 
exceptions. Goebel et al. (2012) investigated the extent to which firm-level antecedents – such as 
incentives, codes of conduct, ethical leadership, and expected obedience to authority – drive the 
implementation of sustainable and social-supplier selection practices.  
  By setting up a path analytic model we aim to answer the following research questions: 1. 
How do leadership styles (obedience to authority and ethical leadership) and incentives impact 
green supplier championing and greenwashing? 2. How do leadership styles and incentives 
interact in the pursuit of green supplier championing and greenwashing? In answering these 
questions we particularly contribute to the field by identifying how green supplier championing 
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can be promoted without a simultaneous incentivizing of greenwashing activities. Furthermore, 
our results highlight complementarity and counterproductive effects in obedience to authority 
and ethical leadership styles that managers should be aware of when promoting sustainable 
orientation in supplier management practices. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In the subsequent section, 
hypotheses are developed and the overall framework is introduced. The third section describes 
the data collection and data analysis process. We then present the results of the measurement 
model and hypotheses tests regarding the path analytical model, followed by the discussion of 
theoretical and practical interpretations of our findings. The article concludes with a summary of 
the key findings, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
2. Literature background and hypothesis development  
2.1 Leadership styles 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) propose that organizations are a reflection of their leaders. Previous 
literature suggests that strategic choices of employees and organizational outcomes are partially 
predicted by managerial characteristics and leadership styles (Brown et al., 2005; Brown and 
Mitchell, 2010; Fehr et al., 2015). The values of top executives are particularly important from 
two perspectives: On the one hand, such personnel have the necessary status to influence 
individual and organizational actions, and on the other hand, many employees are actively 
orienting themselves in ethical dilemmas to their leaders (Brown et al., 2005; Finkelstein et al., 
1996). With respect to leadership, we ground our investigation in two dimensions of leadership: 
ethical leadership and obedience to authority, which both have been embraced in several 
important studies on ethical culture (e.g., Godoz-Díez et al., 2011; Treviño et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, these aspects reflect the most widely investigated theories of leadership, namely, 
transactional (obedience to authority) and transformational (ethical) leadership.  
The main difference between transformational and transactional leadership is manifested 
in terms of what leaders and followers offer to one another (Conger and Kanungo, 1998). 
Transformational leaders offer a purpose that transcends short-term goals and focuses on higher 
order intrinsic needs. They “communicate a collective vision and inspire followers to look 
beyond their self-interests for the good of the group” (Turner et al., 2002, p. 305). According to 
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Bass and Steidlmeier (1999), transformational leaders are highly ethical, focused on values and 
act as sustainability role models, thereby demonstrating to their subordinates how they would 
like them to act on their behalf. Hence, these leaders are characterized by interpersonal behavior, 
fairness, and high expectations of one’s self (Treviño et al., 1999). Transactional leaders, in 
contrast, focus on exchanging resources in an adequate manner. Adequate in this sense means, 
that there is reciprocity between autonomous agents involved such that each might benefit 
through the exchange process (Burns, 1978; Simola et al., 2012). To achieve this purpose, 
transactional leaders focus mainly on measures with which they control and influence their 
followers. However, both leadership styles have advantages and disadvantages regarding 
sustainability implementation in the upstream supply chain. By addressing how these opposing 
styles empower symbolic and substantive measures in supplier management, we help 
practitioners to better understand the intricacies of these leadership styles’ enabling roles.  
2.2 Greenwashing and supplier championing 
In cases in which there is commitment but no implementation of green (sustainable) practices or 
deviation from it (i.e., selective disclosure), one should speak of greenwashing (Kim and Lyon, 
2014; Marquis et al., 2016; Ramus and Montiel, 2005). From a general perspective, 
greenwashing is an important phenomenon as it is said to lead to numerous negative effects, such 
as (1) the reduced credibility of sustainable mechanisms and initiatives (Hsu, 2011; Pedersen and 
Neergard, 2006), (2) the increased likelihood of detection of non-compliance by non-
governmental organizations or consumers (Delmas and Burbano, 2011), and (3) the loss of 
confidence of consumers, investors, non-governmental organizations, and/or employees of the 
firm (Jahdi and Acikdilli, 2009; Lyon and Montgomery, 2015; Painter-Morland, 2006; Walker 
and Wan, 2011). Greenwashing is particularly important in supply chain management due to the 
large impact of suppliers on the focal firm’s eco- and ethical footprint (Sarkis et al., 2011), yet it 
there is still need for more accurate empirical evidence on the drivers and deterrents of 
greenwashing in this context (Lyon and Montgomery, 2015; Marquis et al., 2016).  
In its essence, the practice of championing uses direct suppliers as multipliers in 
addressing the previously mentioned challenges. Due to the Original Equipment Manufacturer’s 
(OEM) structural distance to 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers which results in information deficits for the 
OEM buying firm (Sharfman et al., 2009), in times of globalized supply chain networks and 
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higher stages of complexity, the importance of championing is increasing. For instance, BASF 
practices a sustainable supplier collaboration program where suppliers receive BASF 
development programs for free, but in turn have develop three critical suppliers as sub-suppliers 
to BASF on their own. In this context, it is found that firms that seek green champions as 
suppliers expect that these firms tend to pass on sustainability requirements to their suppliers 
(Gonzalez et al., 2008; Tate et al., 2011). 
2.3. Hypothesis development 
The proposed research model is shown in Figure 1, comprising five constructs and the relation-
ships among them. Table I defines the five constructs. In this path analytical model we examine 
the extent to which obedience to authority, ethical leadership, and ethical incentive drive either 
greenwashing, green supplier championing, or both. In the following discussion, we present the 
arguments for these hypotheses. 
TAKE IN FIGURE 1  
TAKE IN TABLE 1 
2.3.1. Linking leadership to green supplier championing and greenwashing  
Obedience to authority and ethical leadership are two seemingly different dimensions of 
leadership, and as such, we expect then to have opposing effects on green supplier championing 
and greenwashing.  
Ethical leadership is defined as ‘‘the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct 
through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to 
followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making’’ (Brown et al., 
2005, p. 120). Prior empirical studies has shown that there is a positive link between ethical 
leadership and ethical culture and climate (Carlson and Perrewe, 1999; Dickson et al., 2001; Lu 
and Lin, 2014; Mayer et al., 2009; Schminke et al., 2005), resulting in increased whistle-blowing, 
follower prosocial behavior, prevention of workplace incivility, and further desirable aspects 
within the ethical organizational context (e.g., Brown and Mitchell, 2010; Fehr et al. 2015; 
Taylor and Pattie, 2014). Some researchers also suggest that employees trust the ethical norms 
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displayed by executives more than any other formal guidelines, such as codes of conduct (Godos-
Díez et al., 2011; Treviño and Brown, 2004). 
In their pursuit of ethical behavior, top managers are crucial to organizations as they serve 
as role models for influencing ethical behavior of employees (Avolio et al., 2009; Du et al., 2013; 
Treviño and Youngblood, 1990, Shamir and Eilam, 2005). By living “practices, policies, and 
procedures that help to facilitate employee’s perceptions of the organization’s ethical climate” 
(Lu and Lin, 2014, p. 211), ethical behavior can become a genuine interest of employees when 
promoted and driven by senior management norms and appropriate behavior (Adam and 
Rachman-Moore, 2004). Thus, in organizations where the ethical culture is shaped by the 
demonstration of ethical behavior in leader actions, it can be expected that employees imitate this 
behavior (Finkelstein et al., 1996; Treviño, 1990; Treviño and Brown, 2004). Hence, in the 
context of this study, we argue that if senior managers engage in proactive sustainable supply 
chain management practices (i.e., green supplier championing), their subordinate employees will 
follow and also pursue these practices.  
Moreover, ethical leaders have high ethical values that motivate subordinates to behave in 
the best interest of the organization (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Mayer et al., 2009), allowing 
employees to embrace various externally induced stakeholder demands with respect to green 
ethical and green supplier practices (Carter and Rogers, 2008; Vera and Crossan, 2004) as 
noncompliance with these standards could result in severe negative consequences (e.g., 
reputational damage and financial loss (Hofmann et al., 2014). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Ethical leadership is positively related to green supplier championing. 
Opposed reasoning explains why greenwashing is less present in ethical leadership as 
highly committed ethical leaders will not encourage employees to implement greenwashing 
measures that are not in line with the genuine interests of ethical leadership (Brown et al., 2005). 
As greenwashing behavior in supplier management does not address sustainability issues in the 
upstream supply chain, it is not consistent with the values of ethical leadership and would, 
therefore, lead to identification problems. Thus, we hypothesize:  
 H1b: Ethical leadership is negatively related to greenwashing.  
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Obedience to authority has been highlighted as a valid and widely present dimension of 
organizational culture (Snell, 1999; Treviño et al., 2000; Werhane, 2013). It refers to an 
atmosphere in which decisions are based on hierarchy in the organization and where roles and 
expectations are clearly defined, thus suppressing the ethical values of individuals (Higgins and 
Gordon, 1985). The phenomenon originated with the Milgram paradigm, which states that under 
certain circumstances, people act without consideration of their own conscience when they are 
strictly told to perform a task (Milgram, 1974; Rosenhan et al., 1976). Since then, it is commonly 
supposed that many people might “obey authority figures even if that means harming another 
person” (Treviño and Brown, 2004, p. 72). For instance, in interviews with MBA executives, 
Badaracco and Webb (1995) find that many of them had faced ethical dilemmas in the business 
world and that mainly obedience to authority forced them to behave unethically due to their 
anxiety of losing the position or job. However, obedience is not only required when supervisors 
ask subordinates to perform unethical practices, it is also reflected in the role of authority in the 
organization. Thus, Treviño and Weaver (2003) highlight the role of ethical culture-based aspects 
such as obedience to authority as an important factor in predicting unethical behavior in 
organizations.  
If leaders in supply chain management units are not committed to sustainability, they may 
be inclined to circumvent the actions required to implement green supplier championing as it is a 
complex and time-consuming practice (Gallear et al., 2015; Wilhelm et al., 2016). Consequently, 
ethical followers (i.e., employees) might be inclined to signal compliance (i.e., symbolic 
behavior) without actually implementing proactive championing measures (i.e., substantial 
measures) in order to benefit from the situation as they can invest the time on other career 
enhancing activities then. Furthermore, in cases where leaders demand obedience to authority 
rather than to act as authentic ethical role models, subordinates might be inclined to greenwash to 
appease their managers and stakeholders in the short run without making the investment into 
substantial, proactive environmental practices. In this case, it is clear that followers, even though 
they might be personally committed to sustainability, may implement requested activities from 
the leader at a superficial level as a symbolic gesture of compliance as “most adults are 
followers, when it comes to ethics” (Treviño and Brown, 2004, p. 72). Thus, we hypothesize: 
 H2: Obedience to authority is positively related to greenwashing. 
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2.3.2. The moderating effect of incentives 
From the literature review, we ascertain that there is some interplay between ethical leadership 
and transactional incentives when promoting either substantial championing or symbolic 
greenwashing conduct (e.g., Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Ims et al., 2014; Tullberg, 2009; 
Weaver et al., 1999a).  
Incentives provide guidance on how to behave and how to make ethical decisions (e.g., 
McCabe and Treviño, 1993) and have been shown to impact sustainability and ethical behavior 
(e.g., Butterfield et al., 1996; Goebel et al., 2012; Kaptein, 2009). The investigation of incentives 
is particularly important as managers can effectively and immediately influence subordinate 
behavior through incentives of different kind. While rewards encourage actions in a certain 
manner, punishment intends to discourage certain actions (Lee and Lee, 2002; Treviño et al., 
1999). It has been shown that employees not only want to be confronted with ethical rules, but 
that they also want these rules to be formally enforced beyond signaling the specific behavior 
that is expected from them (Treviño et al., 2000; Treviño and Brown, 2004). Rewards and 
punishments complement each other as incentives for ethical behavior. Prior studies argue that 
ethical behavior is only achieved, if it is encouraged while unethical behavior is also explicitly 
discouraged (e.g., Lee and Lee, 2002; Treviño, 1992; Treviño and Brown, 2004). Otherwise, a 
negative spiral effect may occur (Wenzel, 2004). For example, employees may learn that they 
can cheat on their ethical efforts without being penalized. However, we do not intend to 
hypothesize the direct impact of ethical incentives on ethical behavior as the positive effect is 
well supported in the literature (e.g., Chen, 2010; Kulshreshta, 2005), but rather, we explore the 
moderating role of ethical incentives on the link between ethical leadership and green supplier 
championing and greenwashing.  
The line of reasoning we follow in this study is that employees are not encouraged by 
incentives per se but that they are rather stimulated through the actions of their supervisors as 
role models and via intrinsic motivation (Fehr et al., 2015; Ims et al., 2014). Nevertheless, it may 
be argued that incentives have several dimensions of impact and that they can serve as extrinsic 
motivation, for instance in monetary aspects (Tullberg, 2009). Thus, incentives that are not 
aligned with the intended outcome might destroy the commitment of employees as certain 
employees might be promoted that do not commit themselves to the suggested activities (Ims et 
al., 2014; Tullberg, 2009). Furthermore, some subordinates may still require explicit rewards (or 
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punishment) as encouragement (or discouragement) to compliance (or noncompliance) with the 
leader in the supply chain management unit (Wenzel, 2004).  
Thus, we argue that ethical leadership and ethical incentives have a complementary effect 
on green supplier championing, reasoning that can also be based on the complementarity of 
transformational and transactional leadership aspects as proclaimed by ethicists (Kaptein, 2009) 
and supply chain scholars (Goebel et al., 2012). Thus, we hypothesize:  
H3a: Ethical incentives moderate the relationship of ethical leadership and green supplier 
championing in a way that higher levels of ethical incentives lead to higher levels of green 
supplier championing from ethical leadership.  
Following the same line of reasoning, we argue that ethical incentives will not only 
positively moderate the impact on green supplier championing but that they will also attenuate 
the negative impact of ethical leadership on greenwashing. 
H3b: Ethical incentives moderate the relationship of ethical leadership and greenwashing in a 
way that higher levels of ethical incentives lead to lower levels of greenwashing from ethical 
leadership. 
In line with the tenets of transactional leadership theory, obedience to authority and 
incentives are tightly coupled concepts as two pillars for promoting follower behavior (Groves 
and LaRocca, 2011; Hofmann and Jones, 2005; McGregor, 2006). In a firm environment reigned 
by obedience to authority principles, it is important that desired activities are encouraged and 
unwanted behavior is clearly discouraged. We argued previously that obedience to authority 
positively impacts greenwashing and we extend this notion further such that ethical incentives 
additionally encourage greenwashing behavior. If leaders decide upon green supplier criteria 
themselves and in a top-down management style, this will encourage compliance rather than 
commitment among subordinates. Employees will be less critical when discussing the requested 
actions and will be more inclined to implement the activities that they are requested to pursue 
rather than implementing substantive practices, such as green supplier championing. Thus, we 
can expect that such a configuration will lead to a perverted effect of incentives that encourages a 
downward spiral of greenwashing behavior, even though leadership does not directly demand the 
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employees to greenwash. Hence, the effect of incentives is thus dependent on the leadership 
context. Consequently, we hypothesize:  
H4: Ethical incentives moderate the relationship of obedience to authority and greenwashing 
in a way that higher levels of ethical incentives lead to higher levels of greenwashing from 
obedience to authority.  
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data collection 
The survey instrument was finalized based on a pre-test to ensure the content validity of scales, 
particularly for the construct of green supplier championing. Purchasing executives and 
researchers were involved, and the survey followed a key informant approach. As procurement-
related constructs as well as organizational-level constructs were queried, strategic procurement 
managers were deemed the most appropriate and knowledgeable key informants (e.g., Cousins et 
al., 2006; Krause et al., 2007). To test this assumption, we asked participants to report on how 
knowledgeable and confident they were in responding (Cannon and Perreault Jr, 1999). The 
results support the premise that the key informants were appropriately selected (mean value of 
5.13 on a 7-point Likert scale). 
The target sample consisted of multinational companies in Germany with codes of 
conduct for sustainability. The German business environment was selected to control for 
influences of national culture. The German economy has been exposed to green-related issues for 
some time (Ehrgott et al., 2011). Moreover, German businesses are recognized for their green 
awareness and demand for green corporate citizenship from their suppliers which enabled us to 
detect sufficient variance across the dependent variables (Maignan and Ferrell, 2003).   
Potential participants were identified based on the executive education database at one of 
the authors’ university. To ensure the respondents were knowledgeable, we only approached 
people who participated in purchasing- and supply chain management-related training and who 
held positions in these fields. We thoroughly planned and conducted the data collection 
according to the total design method to ensure a high response rate (Dillman, 1978). The sample 
consisted of 629 procurement managers who were initially contacted via e-mail. Responses were 
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collected via telephone interviews (nti=70) and online surveys (nos=48). Telephone interviews 
increased the response rate and reduced the likelihood of missed values and misunderstood 
questions. However, as the data stems from one population, we analyzed the data in one data set. 
We also checked whether informant responses in telephone interviews varied significantly from 
those in online surveys and compared means between the two groups based on one randomly 
selected item per construct. No significant differences were detected between the two groups on a 
5% significance level. The final sample consisted of 118 participants, corresponding to an 
effective response rate of 18.8%, which is comparable to other research in the field of supplier 
management (e.g., Hollos et al., 2012; Narasimhan and Das, 2001). The sample descriptives are 
provided in Table II. Since social desirability was potentially biasing results, all survey items 
were formulated in such a way that respondents did not have to respond to categories for which 
they were personally responsible. Accordingly, the survey addressed green supplier championing 
and greenwashing at an organizational level as opposed to an individual level. 
TAKE IN TABLE 2 
3.2. Measures 
The measures for our study were adopted from established and tested scales whenever possible 
(see Table 3). We only developed new scales for green supplier championing as a result of our 
literature review and expert workshops. Green supplier championing is a proactive management 
practice in the sourcing field that refers to the extent to which purchasers seek suppliers that 
pursue sustainable criteria on their own initiative rather than seeking suppliers that merely 
comply with applicable laws and regulations. In all other cases, such as greenwashing, we 
measured latent constructs based on existing scales and borrowed mainly from the influential 
research of Treviño et al. (1998).  
Obedience to authority and ethical leadership reflect two leadership styles that influence 
ethical behavior in organizations. In the case of obedience to authority, employees are expected 
to precisely follow the instructions of superiors. In the ethical leadership construct, we assessed 
the extent to which senior managers serve as role models for their employees. The construct 
‘ethical incentives’ is a two-factor, second-order formative construct that reflects the dual nature 
of incentives. Thus, it was measured by using two multi-item constructs, punishing unethical 
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behavior and rewarding ethical behavior that assess the extent to which unethical behavior is 
disciplined in the organization and ethical behavior is rewarded.  
Finally, greenwashing as a construct requires special attention because it measures 
whether a firm is only pretending to behave in a sustainable manner. As greenwashing constructs 
are strongly impacted by social desirability bias, we did not inquire about the practices of the 
respondent, but rather the practices of the firm. Symbolic measures may lead firms to implement 
codes of conduct that are actually only used for window-dressing as the measures mentioned in 
the codes of conduct are not substantially implemented, and as such must be regarded as 
greenwashing. It has been emphasized that such codes are only there “to pull the wool over the 
eyes of investors and activist groups, knowing well that their actual compliance with codes 
cannot be monitored or enforced” (Painter-Morland, 2006, p. 353). Codes of conduct have been 
the topic of intense focus in supplier management practice and have been found to be a major 
element of greenwashing behavior in buying firms (Jiang, 2009b). Therefore, we specifically 
focus on the role of codes of conduct in investigating greenwashing. All of our sample firms had 
codes of conduct that were widely established in purchasing and supply management. Thus, by 
determining whether the code of conduct was a window-dressing measure rather than a 
substantial measure, the respondent directly assessed the degree of greenwashing in the firm. The 
scales to measure greenwashing were adopted from the influential work of Treviño et al. (1998) 
to ensure content validity and reliability. All constructs were measured using seven-point Likert-
type scales with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” as anchors. 
3.3. Non-response bias and common method variance 
Non-response bias can be an important issue in survey research as self-selection of respondents 
can lead to severe biases. Some firms may wish to demonstrate how advanced they are in certain 
practices, while others have recently been involved in adverse events related to unethical 
business behavior and therefore may not want to participate in research on that topic (Ketokivi 
and Schroeder, 2004). Therefore, we tested for non-response bias in several ways. We asked the 
non-respondents to indicate the reasons for not participating in the study. Two major reasons 
were expressed, both of which have been addressed in earlier studies. The reasons were a lack of 
time/resources and a general corporate policy not to participate in surveys. Furthermore, we 
compared early and late responses, as suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977). Based on the 
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response dates, we separated the sample into two groups of early and late respondents. We 
analyzed the differences in demographic variables (firm size) and one randomly selected 
indicator per construct across the two groups. The tests did not reveal statistically significant 
differences for any item across the two groups. Thus, we assume that non-respondents did not 
have a significant impact on the results of our findings (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975).  
As only one respondent per firm was available and particularly objective measures on 
dependent variables were not publicly available, we pursued rigorous common method bias tests 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). The Harman (1967) single factor analysis did not reveal indications for 
common method variance. The test revealed four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, thus 
accounting for 78.0% of the variance. The first factor accounted for 28.3% of the explained 
variance while the second and third factors were 28.0% and 12.0%, respectively. These findings 
suggest that common method variance was not an issue for our analysis or for the subsequent 
results.  
4. Data analysis and results 
We chose the partial least square (PLS) approach and the software package SmartPLS 2.0 
(Ringle et al., 2005) to estimate the parameters of our path analytic model (Chin, 1998; 
Lohmöller, 1989). We considered the PLS approach appropriate for particular three reasons: (1) 
It is suitable for relatively small samples as its estimation approach is component-based and uses 
bootstrapping, which makes it less prone to Type I error. (2) The estimates of the individual path 
coefficients are more conservative than in covariance-based techniques. Thus, PLS is well suited 
for establishing the direction and significance of a relationship and for determining whether 
exogenous variables explain a meaningful amount of variance in an endogenous construct. (3) It 
produces robust results for non-normal data distributions (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Chin, 1998; 
Roberts et al., 2010).  
The sample size of our study fulfilled the demand of at least 50 to 100 respondents (Chin 
and Newsted, 1999). Other heuristics further justified our choice for PLS such as the sample size 
minimum of 10 times the number of maximum items per construct or 10 times the total number 
of used constructs (Peng and Lai, 2012). In particular, because the size of the sample was 
included in the calculation of the t-values in the PLS approach, high t-values with smaller sample 
sizes were even more meaningful than in the case of large sample sizes. Given that PLS does not 
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work with an overall model fit index, we relied on sufficiently high R² values, total effect size, 
predictive relevance and construct reliability, as well as significant path coefficients to 
demonstrate the meaningfulness of our model (Chin, 1998; Ringle et al., 2012). These are 
displayed in Tables 4 and 5. 
4.1. Construct validation 
Convergent validity and unidimensionality (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) were supported for all 
items, as they showed statistically significant standardized loadings with their underlying 
constructs in a simultaneous estimation of measurement and the structural model in PLS 
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Moreover, the average variance extracted (AVE) of each 
construct ranged from 0.741 to 0.889, thus exceeding the threshold of 0.5. All tests of 
discriminant validity were similarly supportive. Table 4 illustrates that each construct shares a 
greater variance with its measures than it does with other constructs (Chin, 1998; Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981; Hulland, 1999). This is further confirmed by comparing the cross loadings of the 
items (Chin, 1998). Reliability was established using internal consistency method estimated by 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951; Litwin, 1995) and composite reliability (CR) (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). The Cronbach alpha values range from 0.803 to 0.968, and the CR values range 
from 0.896 to 0.974, and exceed all the minimum threshold of 0.7. These results demonstrate the 
reliability and validity of the measurement model. All descriptive data are presented in Table 3 
and Table 4.  
TAKE IN TABLE 3 
TAKE IN TABLE 4 
 
4.2. Hypotheses testing 
The structural model depicted in Figure 2 was utilized to test our research model. We used the 
standard the bootstrapping algorithm for rigorous PLS analysis to test the significance levels of 
our hypotheses (Chin, 1998; Chin and Newsted, 1999). Henseler and Fassott (2010) recommend 
a minimum of 500 samples or data sets to decrease the effects of possible random sampling 
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errors; therefore, we used 2,000 data sets since adding additional data sets would have made only 
a marginal difference. Furthermore, we used different data sets (1,000 and 1,500) as sensitivity 
analysis to demonstrate that our results are stable. This model explained 20.7% of the variance in 
greenwashing and 53.6% of the variance in green supplier championing.  
While the effect of ethical leadership on green supplier championing was statistically 
significant (H1a: p < 0.01), the negative effect of ethical leadership on greenwashing was not 
significant (H1b: ns). The effect of obedience to authority on greenwashing was statistically 
significant (H2: p < 0.01). Among the moderating hypotheses concerning the complementary 
effect of ethical incentives in conjunction with ethical leadership, we did not find support for 
such an effect on green supplier championing (H3a: ns) or greenwashing (H3b: ns), while the 
hypothesized moderating effect between obedience to authority and ethical incentives on 
greenwashing was supported (H4: p < 0.01). 
To determine if the significant moderating effect was a major or minor effect, we applied 
the pseudo F test1, which compared the additional effect of moderation on the R2 values on green 
supplier championing and greenwashing. The results of this analysis are depicted in Table 5. The 
change in R2 was found to be statistically significant at p < 0.01 for H4.  
TAKE IN TABLE 5 
TAKE IN FIGURE 2 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our suggested model consists of the three core drivers of green supplier championing and 
greenwashing: We investigated the effect of ethical leadership, obedience to authority, and 
ethical incentives. Furthermore, we assessed the interaction effects between incentives and the 
                                                      
1 The pseudo F-test is similar to the test employed to test nested models in stepwise linear regression. The f2 statistic 
is computed based on the differences in R2. The f2 value is calculated by dividing (R2partial – R2full) by (1 – R2partial). 
The pseudo F statistic is calculated by multiplying f2 by (n – k – 1), with a 1 and (n – k) degree of freedom where n 
is the sample size and k is the number of independent constructs in the model. 
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two leadership styles when assessing their impact on green supplier championing and 
greenwashing.  
We find support for the positive impact of ethical leadership on green supplier 
championing. This is in line with prior literature that finds positive effects of ethical leadership 
on ethical outcomes in organizations and the overall ethical atmosphere (e.g., Fernández and 
Camacho, 2016; Grojean et al., 2004; Metcalf and Benn, 2013). Particularly, this finding 
contributes to the call for more research on the effect of leadership styles on the implementation 
of CSR and sustainability in organizations (Eisenbeiss, 2012; Waldmann and Siegel, 2008). The 
current concept of ethical leadership entails four essential normative reference points of which 
the responsibility/sustainability aspect is often overlooked (Eisenbeiss, 2012). However, this 
aspect illustrates a leader’s orientation towards a “long-term focus on organizational 
performance, reflection upon the impact of decisions on society and the natural environment” 
such as in the practice of green supplier championing (Eisenbeiss, 2012, p. 796). 
However, ethical leadership does not cause firms to significantly diminish greenwashing 
despite the estimated negative path coefficients. In addition, we find that obedience to authority 
is positively associated with greenwashing. This finding supports Treviño and Brown (2004, p. 
73)’s statement that “bad behavior doesn’t always result from flawed individuals. Instead, it may 
result from a system that encourages or supports flawed behaviour”. Hence, if no ethical leader is 
present in an organization, employees might be directed and “obey” only towards the ultimate 
goal of business, which is to increase its profits, thereby neglecting CSR and sustainability issues 
(Friedman, 1970) as prescribed by the economic logic and implicit or explicit management 
targets. Accordingly, prior research has shown that the relationship towards suppliers in an 
organization might be ethical or exploitative, dependent on the ethical setting within the supply 
chain management function (Schleper et al., 2015).  
The combined results show that obedience to authority (as important aspects of 
transactional leadership) and ethical leadership do not complement each other in achieving the 
reduction of greenwashing in supplier management. Based on the positive direct effects 
estimated for Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2, we conclude that the two leadership styles conflict 
with each other if the firm seeks to implement green supplier championing. This further 
highlights the relevance of the conscious behavior of leaders in conjunction with sustainable 
management along the supply chain as ethical leadership has been determined to be the way to 
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attain substantial green supplier championing practices (Fernández and Camacho, 2016; Metcalf 
and Benn, 2013).  
Adding further to this discussion, ethical incentives do not further support ethical leaders 
in implementing such advanced substantial practices, which is at least partially counterintuitive. 
Rather, if firms would like to focus on practices that actually go beyond the usually requested 
commitment to sustainability, incentives do not provide additional means to persuade 
subordinates to do so. A common assumption for this finding is the so-called “crowding-out 
effect” also often referred to as “the hidden cost of reward” (Deci, 1976; Ims et al., 2014). In 
some cases, the intrinsic motivation to behave ethically or in our case to pursue sustainable 
supply chain management (i.e., green supplier championing) can be reduced by external rewards 
(i.e., incentives) (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Frey, 1997). Hence, in the same line of argumentation, 
we do not find support for the hypothesis that higher levels of ethical incentives lead to lower 
levels of greenwashing from ethical leadership. Another explanation for this finding could be the 
bi-dimensional understanding of ethical leadership as consisting of a “moral person” and a 
“moral manager” (Treviño, et al. 2000; Treviño and Nelson, 2011). Whereas the moral person 
aspect refers to what has been described as the ethical role model, illustrating the right and good 
behavior of the leader, the moral manager needs to draw on rather transactional means, such as 
rewarding good and right behavior and punishing unethical actions (Bonner et al., 2016). 
Therefore, the incentive aspect could already be entangled in the ethical leadership construct 
itself. However, the results highlight that ethical incentives can serve as a substitute for ethical 
leadership as the direct impact of incentives on green supplier championing is positive (Table 4; 
Table 5). This positive direct effect has been widely investigated and supported by past research 
(e.g., Treviño, 1992; Treviño et al., 1999; Treviño et al., 2000). Ceteris paribus, senior managers 
should lead the organization by example and combine it with clear incentive and punishment 
systems to foster green supplier championing (cp. Locke et al., 2009; Treviño and Brown, 2004; 
Weaver et al., 1999a; 1999b) The trade-off relationship between incentives and ethical leadership 
is a novel finding in this context, while our results complement earlier research demonstrating the 
central role of exemplary executive management behavior in promoting the implementation of 
ethical practices in firms (e.g., Fernández and Camacho, 2016; Grojean et al., 2004; Weaver et 
al., 1999b). Particularly in the context of proactive green supplier championing practices, such 
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leadership appears necessary if employees are to professionally and systematically pursue such 
time-consuming practices. 
Moreover, the previous finding is particularly noteworthy as the focus on obedience to 
authority in conjunction with ethical incentives may foster the beginning of a greenwashing 
spiral (Wenzel, 2004). Thus, for the implementation of green supplier championing behavior and 
a simultaneous avoidance of greenwashing, employee empowerment through ethical leadership, 
as opposed to obedience to authority, seems indispensable (Brown et al., 2005). Sustainable 
practices cannot be genuinely implemented simply because executive management incentivize 
ethical behaviors or punish unethical actions in an environment where obedience to authority is 
present. Thus, ethical incentives and obedience to authority seem to complement each other in 
the promotion of greenwashing. Although senior management might have good intentions 
requesting ethical conduct based on incentives, under the strong presence of requested obedience 
to authority, such leadership may pervert effects and lead to increased greenwashing. Hence, the 
sole reliance on incentives is likely to backfire if the organization is managed by obedience to 
authority given that both the direct and the moderation hypotheses focusing on obedience to 
authority and greenwashing were supported. As opposed to enforcing sustainability behavior 
with suppliers through structured directives and incentives, upper management must additionally 
lead by example when seeking to enhance the firm’s level of green supplier championing. Our 
finding complements a recent finding on the need to provide creative leeway for environmental 
entrepreneurship within the firm to promote green supplier championing (Paulraj, 2011). Ethical 
leadership leaves sufficient room for enthusiastic subordinates to develop championing 
approaches and behaviors without actually predefining what championing behavior constitutes in 
gestalt of codes of conduct and incentives.  
As our hypothesis on the interaction effect between ethical incentives and ethical 
leadership is not supported, it seems reasonable to conclude that ethical leadership and obedience 
to authority are in conflict with each other when reducing greenwashing. Moreover, only ethical 
leadership supports green supplier championing. Based on these results and the discussed 
implications, we can establish an order of events for managers striving to configure and 
implement green supplier championing. Managers should start by creating an atmosphere 
conducive to sustainability principles based on their leadership style before they formally 
implement reward and punishment mechanisms.  
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Moreover, extant literature suggests that incentives are only effective if the organization 
is actually able to pose a credible threat to detect unethical behavior (e.g., Herath and Rao, 2009; 
Li et al., 2010; Schleper and Busse, 2013). The feeling of employees that they will not be 
detected or be penalized might provoke greenwashing rather than the intended green supplier 
championing. Thus, the configuration of sustainable product and supplier assessment tools 
should precede the implementation of ethical incentives, thus allowing an organization to gain 
experience in applying green practices and to generate learning effects (Reuter et al., 2010) 
before sustainable supplier performance and individual employee behavior are formally 
monitored and incentivized.  
To conclude, our results suggest that incentives do not always lead to the intended results 
if behavioral uncertainty in sustainability is particularly high and potentially damaging to the 
firm (Cousins et al., 2004). Instead, we found that incentives may even lead to negative 
consequences when leadership is mostly based on obedience to authority. Furthermore, our 
results provide evidence that if firms want to consistently pursue substantial green supplier 
championing, it is necessary to establish a culture founded on ethical leadership rather than on 
expected obedience to authority. Finally, it is necessary to consider green supplier championing 
and greenwashing simultaneously as they seem to be two sides of the same coin. Thus, decision 
makers must be aware that their leadership styles and the incentives they set may have 
undesirable side effects when striving for green supplier championing. 
6. Limitations and further research  
Our study has several limitations which we will briefly line out in the following. First, the sample 
size is relatively small and thus requires further studies to confirm the findings of our study, 
particularly in different contexts, such as industry or region. Second, our study focuses 
particularly on a supplier management context, which is a specific field. Thus, the results might 
not be easily generalized to other functional areas in the research domain of business ethics. 
Third, although we focused on common method variance, other studies might find it beneficial to 
seek responses from several individuals per firm or to assess the longitudinal effects, which was 
unfortunately not possible in our research design. Fourth, because we investigated a cross-
industry sample, the observed empirical relationships are not necessarily causal. A focus on a 
particular industry might help future research in this respect. Finally, in this study, greenwashing 
- 22 -  
was captured based on the notion of superficial implementation of codes of conduct that 
represent only one possible dimension of this multidimensional construct. Hence, the results can 
only be generalized based on the notion of overstating practices in their codes of conduct, which 
is not given for all firms. Hence, some business ethicists will probably not agree with this 
operationalization of the concept. Thus, the measurement scale for greenwashing provides 
potential for future studies to develop a more unified conceptualization of the phenomenon. Of 
course, the way we conceptualized greenwashing in this study may have also impacted our 
findings.  
Moreover, in conducting this research, several fruitful avenues for further research, in 
addition to methodological opportunities, became apparent. The most intriguing research gap still 
seems to lie in the combination of supply chain management research and research on ethical 
leadership and behavior. Although the cross-fertilization of these domains of research has 
recently increased, the analysis of further dimensions of ethical leadership culture on supply 
chain management practices is largely unknown both in an ethical as well as in a general context. 
Hence, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which sustainability implementation 
throughout a supply chain is somehow driven by an ethical “clan” culture established during the 
longevity of buyer-supplier relationships. Furthermore, it may be interesting to further explore 
how the likelihood of detection and the severity of the punishment motivates or disincentivizes 
individuals in an organization to champion or to greenwash, as the valance or likelihood of 
detection might influence their behavior. 
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Tables and figures 
Constructs Definition Based on 
Ethical incentives 
The extent to which ethical behavior is 
rewarded and unethical is punished  
Treviño et al., 1998 
Obedience to 
authority 
The extent to which leaders expect 
employees to obey authority without further 
query 
Treviño et al., 1998 
Ethical leadership 
The extent to which leaders act as role 
models for ethical business conduct  
Treviño et al., 1998 
Greenwashing 
The extent to which sustainability measures 
are substantiated to a lesser degree in firm 
practices and measures than they are 
symbolically alluded to in the firm’s code of 
conduct.  
Delmas and Burbano, 
2011; Ramus and 
Montiel, 2005 
Green supplier 
championing 
The extent to which the buying firm pursues 
suppliers that are best practice firms in 
sustainability management, thereby further 
driving and enforcing sustainability in the 
upstream supply chain. 
Cousins et al., 2004; 
Handfield et al., 
2002; Pagell et al., 
2010 
Table 1. Construct definitions 
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Classification N Percentage 
Types of industry   
 Manufacturing 57 48.3 
 Pharmaceuticals and chemicals  20 17.0 
 Transportation and public utilities 13 11.1 
 Services 10 8.4 
 Fashion  5 4.2 
 Food & beverages 5 4.2 
 Others 8 6.8 
Total 118 100 
Annual sales revenues in million € N Percentage 
 < €50 million 14 11.9 
 €50 million to €500 million 23 19.5 
 €500 million to €1 billion 13 11.0 
 €1 billion to €10 billion 38 32.2 
 > €10 billion 30 25.4 
Total 118 100 
Mode of data collection N Percentage 
Telephone interview 70 59.3 
 
Online survey 
48 40.7 
Total 118 100 
 Table 2. Profile of sample organizations 
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Indicators Mean SDa 
Load-
ingb 
Ethical leadership (CA=0.958; CR=0.970; AVE=0.889)c 
Senior managers regularly show that they care about ethics. 5.07 1.66 0.955 
Senior managers model ethical behavior. 4.86 1.50 0.949 
Ethical behavior is the norm in our organization 5.35 1.52 0.920 
Senior managers guide decision making in an ethical direction. 4.88 1.60 0.946 
Obedience to authority (CA=0.826; CR=0.896; AVE=0.741) 
The boss is always right in our organization. 2.92 1.69 0.857 
Our organization expects obedience to authority. 3.72 1.62 0.872 
People in our organization are expected to do as they are told. 4.20 1.51 0.852 
Punishing unethical behaviord (CA=0.803; CR=0.910; AVE=0.814) 
Penalties for unethical behavior are strictly enforced in our organization. 4.15 1.71 0.892 
Management in our organization disciplines unethical behavior when it 
occurs. 
5.11 1.47 0.881 
Unethical behavior is punished in our organization. 4.45 1.71 0.933 
Rewarding ethical behaviord (CA=0.803; CR=0.910; AVE=0.836) 
Ethical behavior is rewarded in our organization. 3.82 1.69 0.917 
People of integrity are rewarded in our organization. 4.03 1.62 0.911 
In our organization, employees who act unethically still receive formal 
organizational rewards (reversely coded).* 
- - - 
Green supplier championing (CA=0.968; CR=0.974; AVE=0.861) 
Purchasing professionals in our organization consciously seek suppliers who 
…encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies. 
4.65 1.64 0.946 
…outperform their competitors regarding emissions or waste levels. 3.82 1.73 0.92 
…support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges. 4.54 1.66 0.942 
…undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. 4.46 1.67 0.942 
…source from environmentally friendly sub-supplier. 4.16 1.71 0.926 
- 34 -  
…are leaders in efficient and clean manufacturing. 4.09 1.79 0.886 
Greenwashing (CA=0.822; CR=0.918; AVE=0.848) 
The code of conduct serves only as ‘window dressing’ in our 
organization. 
2.03 1.54 0.907 
The code of conduct serves only to maintain the organization’s public 
image. 
2.04 1.52 0.934 
a Standard deviation 
b All standardized loadings are significant at p < 0.01 
c CA= Cronbach’s Alpha; CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted.  
d Part of the second-order construct - ethical incentives 
* Item deleted during analysis due to low loading 
Table 3. Validation of constructs 
 
 
 
Constructs Mean  SDa EL OA PUN REW GSC GW 
Ethical leadership (EL) 4.98b 1.46 0.81      
Obedience to authority (OA) 3.64c 1.38 0.30 0.93     
Punishing unethical behavior (PUN) 4.52 1.43 0.79 0.22 0.89    
Rewarding ethical behavior (REW) 3.91 1.47 0.59 0.10 0.55 0.79   
Green supplier championing (GSC) 4.36 1.46 0.71 0.25 0.58 0.58 0.79  
Greenwashing (GW) 2.02 1.32 0.05 0.39 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.81 
a Standard deviation 
b The square root of the construct’s AVE is provided along the diagonal (in bold) 
c Off-diagonal numbers are the Pearson correlations between the constructs 
Table 4. Correlation of constructs  
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 Direct effects 
Direct effects and 
moderation effects 
Substantive relationships 
Path 
coef-     
ficient 
t-
value 
Std. 
error 
Path 
coef-
ficient 
t-
value 
Std. 
error 
H1a: Ethical leadership → Green 
supplier championing (+) 
0.486** 4.924 0.099 0.493** 4.864 0.101 
H1b: Ethical Leadership → 
Greenwashing (–) 
-0.161ns 0.978 0.164 -0.093ns 0.656 0.142 
H2: Obedience to authority → 
Greenwashing (+) 
0.415** 5.079 0.082 0.413** 4.592 0.090 
H3a: Ethical leadership & ethical 
incentives → Green supplier 
championing (+) 
   0.013ns 0.155 0.084 
H3b: Ethical Leadership & ethical 
incentives → Greenwashing 
   0.069ns 0.565 0.123 
H4: Obedience to authority & ethical 
incentives → Greenwashing (+) 
   0.215** 2.630 0.082 
       
Explained variance of endogenous 
variables Q2 R2 R2 F-statistic 
Green supplier championing 0.448 0.536 0.536 0.00 
Greenwashing 0.080 0.159 0.207 6.598 
ns not significant; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01  
Table 5. Estimations of the structural model 
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Figure 1. Research framework 
 
 
Figure 2. Standardized parameter estimates of the structural model (moderated model) 
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